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I Introduction
The military has played an important role in Thai politics and has been involved in ten
successful coups since 1932. Unsuccessful coups have also not been rare, while rumors of
an impending coup have frequently circulated.
This essay deals with three coups which occurred between the start of the Prem
Tinsulanon administration in March 1980 and the downfall of the Chatchai Chunhawan
government in February 1991. There are two reasons why this period is selected. First, it
was a period of gradual democratization of Thai politics. The Kriengsak Chamanan
government (November 1977-March 1980) had started to liberalize the least democratic
policies of the Thanin Kraiwichien government (October 1976-November 1977). The Prem
government (March 1980-August 1988) tried to establish a rule of parliamentary politics
and his successor, Chatchai, was a leader of a political party. Second, the 1978
constitution was in effect during this period. This constitution was rather long-lived in the
Thai political setting [Murashima 1987b] and prohibited active military officers from
becoming cabinet ministers. However, a coup in 1991 abolished the elected parliament and
the 1978 constitution, thus bringing to an end the period of gradual democratization since
1977. In this sense, the years from 1976 to 1991 mark one period in Thai political
history.
Thai politics during this period featured three significant political forces: the military,
the monarch and political parties [Murashima 1987a]. Expectations rose that another coup
would not occur or would fail even if it was attempted because gradual democratization
was observed and two coups in the 1980s had failed [Suchit 1990]. The decreasing
possibility of a successful coup meant less political power for the military, whose most
vital source of political power had since 1932 lain in its ability to stage a successful coup.
This is why the political role of the military will be analyzed by focusing upon coups.
* This essay is a summarized translaion of a Japanese version written in 1991 and does not
mention political events after 1992.
* * .=E. B37.r~ , Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Kyoto University
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This essay is an attempt to answer several important questions concerning coups.
Why did the military stage coups? What factors affected the success or failure of
attempted coups? Were there any factors that deterred the military from staging coups?
Judging from the fact that coups were attempted repeatedly and rumors of expected
coups were heard frequently, it might be thought that military leaders could stage a coup
whenever they wanted to do. However, military leaders were not always planning a coup.
They could not necessarily stage one even if they planned it. They could not always
succeed even if they dared to run the risk. Certain conditions were requisite for them to
stage a coup. Hence, it is possible roughly to indicate under what circumstances the
probability of a coup is strong.
When was a coup attempted? It would be useful to review briefly the causes of the
coups since 1932. It seems that, with an exception of the 1932 coup, where the political
ideal to overthrow the absolute monarchy was significant, there have been four major
causes.
First, serious political turbulence tended to induce many people to turn to the military
for a solution. Just after every coup, the military issued a statement explaining why it had
to resort to the coup. Poor economy, political instability or turbulence, changing
international situations and the threat to national security were recurring themes. They
often were only pretenses. If there were objectively justifiable reasons, the military never
failed to include them in the statement, even if they were not true causes of the coup,
because they would solicit the support or sympathy of the populace for the coup or, at
least, mitigate the opposition against the coup. When there was mountainous discontent
against the previous government among the populace, the statement of the military was
persuasive. Coups in 1947, 1957 and 1977 were cases in point.
Second, worsening relations between the military and the government gave rise to the
high possibility of a coup. The 1933 coup was a typical case. But serious conflict between
the two was rare. The government, recognizing well the political strength of the military,
including its ability to carry out coups and to control the mass media (TV and radio
stations), made efforts to avoid such conflict as much as possible. The military, for its part,
rarely made unreasonable claims on the government, since it had to pay attention to its
own reputation.
Third, internal conflict between factions within the military could be the cause of a
coup, when one faction tried to do away with a rival faction by this means. Internal
conflict leading to a possible coup has been restricted to within the army since the 1950s
and been closely interrelated with struggles for prominent positions. 1 )
Fourth, there were several coups the military government staged against itself in
1) While the air force was junior to the army from the start, the army defeated the navy In 1951
and the police in 1957, thus establishing indisputably its pre-eminence among the military and
the police.
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order to strengthen the governing power by abolishing the constitution and the elected
parliament. Coups of this type occurred when the government enjoyed full support of the
military. Coups in 1951, 1958 and 1971 were among them.
In practice. coups were motivated not by a single cause but by some combination of
these four causes. Moreover. needless to say. there must be prospects of success for the
military to stage a coup.
In analyzing the three coups after 1981 chronologically. this essay pays special
attention to the reasons of the second and third types. as those of the first and fourth types
can be discerned rather easily. Before proceeding to the analysis, it would be convenient to
explain in brief some important but not well-known features of the internal struggle related
to the personnel management of the army.
The authority for personnel changes resides in the minister of defense for generals,
the army chief for field officers. and division commanders for ranks from captain to second
lieutenant [Kalahom 1962: 161-162J .2) Personnel changes above the rank of general are
usually carried out on 1 October every year. A list of personnel changes of generals is
drafted by the commander-in-chief. checked by the supreme commander and defense
minister. and submitted through the prime minister to the king for sanction. The supreme
commander rarely changes the list because his real power is limited. and the army chief
often holds the post concurrently. Whether the defense minister will change the list or not
depends upon his personal relations with the armed forces. In contrast with Chatchai. who
rarely intervened in personnel changes. Prem had his say because he had his own
supporting base in the army even after his retirement. However, even Prem paid regard to
the will of the army chief. and if he intervened it was usually at the stage of drafting the
list. This is because the revision of the list after its submission to the defense minister
engenders strong opposition from the armed forces.
Therefore. the army chief can generally have his way in the personnel change of
generals and field officers. This does not mean, however, that he can manage personnel
affairs arbitrarily. His authority is limited by some factors. First. as mentioned above.
the defense minister may intervene. Second, seniority is highly valued: promotion with
skipping of ranks is impossible. Among officers of the same rank, the one who attained
the rank earlier has priority. Promotion violating this rule of seniority causes
discontent in the army. Third. he must pay regard to the balance of power so as not to
intensify internal conflict in the army. There are various factions competing for
important posts. If army chief favors some factions excessively at the expense of others.
the disfavored will become discontent and internal conflict will intensify. The armed
forces make much of unity (khwamsamakkhi) and the commander-in-chief must be discreet
in making personnel changes. Fourth. mandatory retirement at age 60 is strictly
2) It is notable that all but 1 of 26 ministers of defense from the 1932 coup to the 1991 coup
were active or retired military officers.
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observed. 3) Exceptional extension of tenure engenders strong opposition among the officers.
These rules governing personnel changes make it difficult for an army chief to centralize
his power highly.
Among army posts, most importance is attached to those commanding fighting units
(jai kamlang) , especially those stationed in Bangkok and the surrounding area. The 1st
army region (stationed in Bangkok) and the special warfare unit (Lopburi) are preferred at
the level of regional command; the 1st, 2nd and 9th infantry divisions (Bangkok, Prajinburi
and Kanjanaburi, respectively), the 1st special warfare, artillery (both in Lopburi),
antiaircraft artillery and the 2nd cavalry (both in Bangkok) divisions at the division level;
and the 1st, 11th (both in Bangkok), 21 st infantry (Chonburi) and the 4th cavalry
(Saraburi) regiments at the regiment level. On the contrary, posts in the supreme command
and the office of permanent undersecretary, and inactive posts attached to commands or
commanders, are unpopular even if appointment to them is accompanied by a rise in rank
and salary, because these posts are devoid of substantial duty or commanding authority.
In the competition for good posts, personal connections are important as well as ability
and performance. Traditionally, personal relations with senior officers and the type of
affiliated corps (infantry, artillery, cavalry and so forth) have been significant as such
connections. However, being classmates of the army cadet academy, which was founded in
1887 and reorganized after the Second World War, has become most important since the late
1970s. The first graduates, in 1954, of the newly reorganized academy were counted as Class
1. The increasing significance of being classmates was mainly due to the remarkable success
of Class 7. Each class came to unite as a pressure group for the purpose of promotion of
classmates.4 ) In addition to the army cadet academy, officers of the three forces have
opportunities to learn at the staff college of the armed forces and the national defense
college. This has given birth to classmates across the boundaries of the three forces.
II The Coup of 1 April 1981
1. The Rise of Class 7 5)
Prem, who had been in the Northeast from 1968 to 1977, became prime minister in March
3) Those who have reached sixty years of age by 30 September must retire on that date. Thus.
officers born in the same year retire in different years depending on whether they were born
before or after this date. Moreover it is quite common that even the most powerful officers lose
power and authority completely on retirement. This is why several army-chiefs in the past
have tried to extend their retirement age.
4) The strength of unity differs from class to class. Usually, even the most united class includes
an anti-mainstream group. And the number of classmates differs from class to class. The
numbers of freshmen of the army cadet academy were, for example, 28 for Class 1, 148 for
Class 5,136 for Class 7, and 168 for Class 12 [JPR 1972: 203-245].
5) As there are excellent studies on Class 7 by Chaianan [1982a; 1982b], this essay does not
refer to the class in detail.
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1980 with strong support from a group of field officers who called themselves thahan num
("Young Turks"). This group was formed in 1973 by Class 7, who graduated the army
cadet academy in 1960 [Chaianan 1982a: 86-87J. Leading officers of the group included
Manun Rupkhajon, Prajak Sawangjit, and Jamlong Simuang. The group joined the 1976 and
1977 coups as a significant force and helped Kriengsak become prime minister. When
Kriengsak became unpopular, they forced him to resign and backed Premo The group
augmented its power and influence because it played a decisive role in important political
events and was a supporter of the highest leaders of the military and politics. Neither
Kriengsak nor Prem had a strong supporting base among the army units in the capital, and
both needed the support of the group. The group got important commanding posts of
regiments and battalions in the capital and the surrounding area in reward for its
support.6 )
There were many officers who felt unhappy with the greater prominence of Class 7.
Generals were uneasy about the powerful field officers. Even field officers were discontent
with the fact that their juniors enjoyed faster promotion and were arrogant. Knowing that
too much dependence on Class 7 was dangerous, Prem started gradually to search for
supporters other than Class 7 among his classmates and former subordinates in the 2nd
army region.
2. The Coup of 1 April 1981
On the night of 31 March, leading members of Class 7 visited Prem to ask him to lead a
coup the next day. But Prem stubbornly refused. Athit Kamlangek, a deputy commander of
the 2nd army region, became aware of the planned coup and telephoned the queen. The
queen ordered the coup group to let Prem come to the royal palace [Athit 1981: 81-82].
Early in the morning of 1 April, a group calling itself "Revolutionary Council" staged a
coup with San Jitpathima. deputy commander-in-chief of the army as leader instead of
Premo
The group, of which the secretary-general was Manun, proclaimed the success of the
coup and explained the reasons for it as follows. As selfish politicians were struggling for
gains under the guise of democracy, this weak and unstable administration would
compromise the survival and safety of the country. The government had not taken decisive
measure to solve the economic problems in spite of the worsening conditions of national
finance and economic life of most of the people. Social justice and traditional good culture
were disappearing, everybody was becoming selfish, laws were not respected and crimes
were increasing. The government had not tried to cope with these imminent problems and
had neglected internal conflicts within the government. The council had to stage a coup
because the solution of these problems was of urgent necessity and was impossible through
parliamentary means [Thairat 1981: 77-80].
6) The group controlled 42 battalions in April 1981 [Chaianan 1982a: 97, 113J.
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Prem went to Suranari base of the 2nd army region in Khorat with the royal family in
the morning of 1 April and set up counter-coup headquarters with Athit's energetic
assistance. The presence of the royal family at the base was decisive for Prem to get the
support of the second, third and fourth regional armies, the navy, and the air force. After
the battle over the control of broadcasting, the 21 st infantry regiment secretly entered
Bangkok early in the morning of 3 April and arrested leading officers of the coup forces.
Coup forces consisted of elite troops and surpassed the government forces in military
strength [Chaianan 1982a: 65]. Nevertheless, the coup was defeated. One reason was that
the coup leaders, having too much confidence in their military strength, did not have a
carefully worked-out plan [Prachamit 1981: 8-9J. Secondly, Prem had managed to go to
Khorat. And, most significantly, the government forces had the king over them. The last
factor was decisive because, first, many officers who, judging from precedents, should have
been neutral joined the government side and, second, the coup forces could not join battle
with the king's forces and were forced to give up without fighting.
The coup group originally tried to have Prem as their leader, which means that the
group did not plan to overthrow the Prem government but to consolidate it. From the
group's point of view, the Prem government could be strengthened if Prem listened to the
group's advice. However, Prem did not always have to listen to them, because he had
supporters other than Class 7, especially anti-Class 7 forces in the army. For example.
officers from Classes 1 to 8 excluding Class 7 had held a gathering on 20 March 1981
[Pisan 1988: 71J. But for these supporters, Prem could not have repeatedly rejected the
advice of the very powerful Class 7. Moreover, there was some talk that members of Class
7 would be demoted to insignificant positions [ibid.: 71]. Therefore, Class 7 intended to
get rid of such anti-Class 7 officers and to win back Premo In fact, the revolutionary
council had prepared a decree to demote many anti-Class 7 officers to insignificant
positions [Thairat 1981: 93-94]. In other words, the major enemies of the group
consisted of rival forces within the army. In this sense, this unsuccessful coup resulted
from internal conflict within the army.
Finally, the coup had a profound effect upon the army. First of all, it highlighted the
king as a check on coups. The defeat of the militarily successful coup made it more
difficult to stage a coup which had little prospect of royal sanction. Second, the remarkable
rise of Class 7 before the coup proved the importance of the solidarity of classmates. The
other classes imitated Class 7. At the same time, top brass became more concerned with
the groupings of field officers. Third, Class 7, leading officers of which were dismissed,
lost power and other factions became more powerful.
III The Coup of 9 September 1985
1. The Rise of Athit and the Problem of Succession
The suppression of the 1981 coup made Athit a hero. He was promoted rapidly to
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commander of the 1st army region in April 1981, assistant army chief in October of the
same year, and army chief in October 1982. Moreover, he came to serve concurrently as
supreme commander of the armed forces in October 1983. His exceptionally rapid
promotion owed heavily to the fact that he had been a supporter of Prem since the 1970s,
played a significant role in the suppression of the coup, and gained the confidence of the
royal family.
Athit gradually promoted classmates of Preparatory Class 5 (P-Class 5, hereafter) to
top brass (see Table 1).7) Army leadership regained the unity which had been lost since the
1970s. His consolidation of power in the army contributed to the stability of the
government. Athit replaced Class 7 as the most powerful supporter of Premo
However, discord between Prem and Athit began to surface from 1983. Athit came to
be regarded as a successor to Prem, and Athit himself started to disclose his political
ambition. It was most convenient for Athit to use his power as army chief to become prime
minis~er. When the transitional clauses of the 1978 constitution lapsed on 21 April 1983,
active officers became unable to assume political positions [Murashima 1987b: 163-164].
On 10 January 1983, Athit urged members of parliament to revise the constitution. On 12
January, Phijit Kunlawanit, commander of the 1st division, suggested the possibility of a
coup by stating that "if nothing is done and chaos results, threatening security, the military
will have to conduct exercises" [Bangkok Post, 13 January 1983]. On 11 February, several
MPs submitted an amendment law. The military criticized the opposition to the proposed
amendment through broadcasts and Chawalit Yongjaiyut, assistant chief of staff of the
army, appealed the legitimacy of the amendment [Athit 1983: 25-55J. However the
amendment law was rejected on 16 March [Pisan 1988: 46-56]. In the midst of stormy
rumors of a coup, the army forced Prem to dissolve the parliament on 19 March.
Prem was elected prime minister after the general election. Athit kept on supporting
Prem while continuing to consolidate power in the army. Athit's supporting base consisted
mainly of P-Class 5, Classes 1, 2, 5, 8 and the group of field officers calling themselves
chang luang ("Royal Elephant"). Leaders of Classes 1 and 2 were Chawalit and Phijit
respectively. Chawalit was promoted to the rank of major general as aide-de-camp of
Defense Minister Prem in 1979. He was director of operations in 1980, assistant chief of
staff in 1982 with the rank of lieutenant general, and deputy chief of staff in 1983. He
was one of the most brilliant officers of the army, serving both Prem and Athit as a staff
and a liaison officer between both. He was a mastermind of the Order of the Prime
Minister's Office 66/2523 issued in 1980, which made more of political than military
measures in implementing counterinsurgency policy [Tamada 1988]. In contrast, Phijit
became famous for his fierce battle with the Communist Party of Thailand in the North and
was promoted from deputy commander of the 4th infantry division to commander of the
7) The army preparatory school was founded in 1940 and had only seven classes. P-Class 7 was
followed by Class 1.
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~ Table 1 Army Leadership and Their Classes, 1980-1991tv
~
Position Date 1 Oct. 1980 1 Oct. 1981 1 Oct. 1982 1 Oct. 1983 1 Oct. 1984 1 Oct. 1985 1 Oct. 1986
--
Generals
Army chief Prem (38)[81 *) Prayut (PI) Athit (P5) Athit (P5) Athit (P5) Athit (P5)[86 *1 Chawalit (Cl)
Deputy army chief San C.(39)[81] Sak (39)[821 Sup (P3)[84] Sup (P3) Thienchai (P5) Juthai (P5)[86] Phisit (P6)[87]
General staff Prayut (Pl)[82) Pamot (P3)[83] Pamot (P3) Banjop (P6)[86] Banjop (P6) Chawalit (Cl)[92] Wanchai R.(Cl)[92]
Assistant army chief Amnat (Pl)[83] Athit (P5)[85] Thienchai (P5)[85] Thienchai (P5) Mana (P5)[851 Suraphon (P5)[86j Phijit (C2)[92]
Pin (39)[81) Phaijit (39)[82) Pathom (P4)[84] Pathom (P4) Ongat (P5)[851 Akkhaphon (P5)[86j Sunthon (Cl)[911
Lt. Generals
Deputy general staff Cham nan (P5) Sup (P3) Prayun (P5) Mana (P5) Juthai (P5) Wanchai R.(Cl) Jaruai (Cl)
Chaloem (PI) Pathom (P4) Banjop (P6) Chawalit (Cl) Chawalit (Cl) Jarat (P7) Sujinda (C5)
Regional commanders
1st army region Wasin (P3) Athit (P5) Phat (P4) Phat (P4) Phijit (C2) Phijit (C2) Watthanachai (C4) ~
2nd army region Lak (39) Phak (P5) Phak (P5) Phak (P5) Phisit (P6) Phisit (P6) Itsaraphong (C5) 3i
3rd army region Sima (PI) Phrom (PI) Phrom (PI) Thiap (P5) Thiap (P5) Thiap (P5) Chaichana (Cl) "J
"4th army region Juan (PI) Han L.(P5) Han L.(P5) Wanchai ].(P5) Wanehai ].(P5) Wanchai ].(P5) Wisit (C2)
"
"J




1st infantry Suchin (P5) Phijit (C2) Phijit (C2) Phijit (C2) Itsaraphong (C5) Wimon (C5) San S.(C5) ~
2nd infantry Aram (P6) Praehum (P7) Praehum (P7) Prachum (P7) San S.(C5) San S.(C5) Manat (C8) w
9th infantry Sing (P5) Somkhit (Cl) Somkhit (Cl) Somkhit (Cl) Choetchai (C5) Choetchai (C5) Mongkhon (C9) <Jill
2nd cavalry Chaichana (C 1) Wichat (C2) Wichat (C2) Wichat (C2) Ariya (C5) Ariya (C5) Ariya (C5)
Antiaircraft artillery Prasat (P4) Prasat (P4) Watthanachai (C4) Watthanaehai (C1) Wirot (C5) Wirot (C5) Wirot (C5)
Artillery Wirot (C5) Phuchong (C5) Phuehong (C5) Phuchong (C5)
3rd infantry Suwan (P4) Bunchai (P7) Bunchai (P7) Bunehai (P7) Somphon (C5) Somphon (C5) Bunthaen (C6)
6th infantry Phisit (P6) Phisit (P6) Itsaraphong (C5) Itsaraphong (C5) Bunthaen (C6) Bunthaen (C6) Banthao (C8)
4th infantry Phrom (PI) Ruamsak (P7) Siri (C4) Siri (C4) Siri (C4) Joe (C5) Joe (C5)
1st cavalry Prayat (P6) Chaiehana (Cl) Chaichana (Cl) Sathon (C4) Sathon (C4) Phairot (C5) Phairot (C5)
5th infantry Prieha (P5) Panya (Cl) Panya (Cl) Jap (C2) Jap (C2) Kitti (C8) Kitti (C8)
1st special warfare Wimon (C5) Wimon (C5) Wimon (C5) Watthana S.(C8) Watthana S.(C8)
2nd special warfare Khajon (C5) Khajon (C5) Kajon (C5) Oraphan (C8)
Position Date 1 Oct. 1987 1 Oct. 1988 1 Oct. 1989 1 Apr. 1990 1 Oct. 1990 1 Apr. 1991 1 Oct. 1991
Generals
Army chief Chaw al it (Cl) Chaw alit (C 1) Chawalit (C1) Sujinda (C5) Sujinda (C5) Sujinda (C5) Sujinda (C5)
Deputy army chief Wanchai R.(C1) Wanchai R.(C1) Sujinda (C5) ltsaraphong (C5) Itsaraphong (C5) Itsaraphong (C5) ltsaraphong (C5)
General staff Jaruai (C1 )[90] Jaruai (C1) Jaruai (C1) Wirot (C5)[961 Wirot (C5) Wirot (C5) Wirot (C5)
Assistant army chief Phijit (C2) Phijit (C2) ltsaraphong (C5)[9~1 Arun (C3) Arun (C3) Chatchom (C5)[931 Chatchom (C5)
Sujinda (C5)[93] Sujinda (C5) Arun (C3)[921 Wimon (C5)[95] Wimon (C5) Wimon (C5) San S.(C5)[94]
Lt. Generals
Deputy general staff Ngamphon (C1) Arun (C3) Wi rot (C5) Pramon (C6) Pramon (C6) Pramon (C6) Pramon (C6)
Kasem (C1) Saphrang (C 1) Chatchom (C5) Chatchom (C5) Thawon (C5) Choetchai (C5) Choetchai (C5)
Regional commanders ~
1st army region Watthanachai (C4) Watthanachai (C4) San S.(C5) San S.(C5) San S.(C5) San S.(C5) Phaibun (C5) ....,p
2nd army region ltsaraphong (C5) Itsaraphong (C5) Wimon (C5) Phaibun (C5) Phaibun (C5) Phaibun (C5) Ariya (C5) i:::p
"3rd army region Siri (C4) Siri (C4) Siri (C1) Siri (C4) Phairot (C5) Phairot (C5) Phairot (C5) ~
4th army region Wisit (C2) Wisit (C2) Yutthana (C4) Yutthana (C4) Yutthana (C4) Kitti (C8) Kitti (C8) n0
c
Special warfare unit Wimon (C5) Wimon (C5) Khajon (C5) Khajon (C5) Khajon (C5) Khajon (C5) Khajon (C5) '0(/J
Maj. Generals ::;
,+:.
w Division commanders ....,::r
1st infantry San S.(C5) Mongkhon (C9) Watthana S.(C8) Watthana S.(C8) Chainarong (C11) Chainarong (C11) Thitiphong (Cl1) ~.~
2nd infantry Mana~ (C8) Manat (C8) Chainarong (C11) Chainarong (C11) Thitiphong (C11) Thitiphong (C11) Phanom (C11) :3po
9th infantry Mongkhon (C9) Watthana S.(C8) Watthana B.(C8) Watthana B.(C8) Watthana B.(C8) Watthana B.(C8) Suwinai (C11)
......
2nd cavalry Ariya (C5) Thotsaphon (C6) Thotsaphon (C6) Thotsaphon (C6) Thotsaphon (C6) Thotsaphon (C6) Yutthaphan (C5) t.O00
Antiaircraft artillery Phaeo (C5) Phaeo (C5) Phaeo (C5) Phaeo (C5) Samphao (C12) Samphao (C12) 0Samphao (C12) I
......
Artillery Phuchong (C5) Suwit (C6) Suwit (C6) Suwit (C6) Suwit (C6) Suwit (C6) Udom (C12) t.Ot.O
3rd infantry Bunthaen (C6) Banthao (C8) Banthao (C8) Banthao (C8) Somphan (C10) Somphan (C10) Somphan (C10) ......
6th infantry Banthao (C8) Chettha (C9) Chettha (C9) Chettha (C9) Prasoet (C 11) Prasoet (C11) Prasoet (C 11)
4th infantry Joe (C5) Somchet (C9) Panthep (C9) Panthep (C9) Panthep (C9) Winit (C9) Winit (C9)
1st cavalry Phairot (C5) Lithai (C8) Lithai (C8) Lithai (C8) Lithai (C8) Lithai (C8) Kamon (C9)
5th infantry Kitti (C8) Jamkat (C8) Jamkat (C8) Jamkat (C8) Sommai (Cll) Sommai (Cll) Sommai (Cll)
1st special warfare Oraphan (C8) Oraphan (C8) Surayut (C12) Surayut (C12) Somsak (C 12) Somsak (C 12) Somsak (C 12)
2nd special warfare Surachet (C8) Surachet (C8) Han P.(Cll) Han P.(C11) Han P.(Cll) Han P.(C11) Han P.(C11)
Notes: 1) Surnames are omitted. Those with same first name are distinguished by the initial of their surnames.
2) Figures in ( ) show classes of army cadet school. PI means preparatory class 1 and C1 class 1. For those who entered the school in or before 1939. the
t;.l year is given.N
VI
3) Figures in I]. given only to generals, show the year of mandatory retirement. Figures marked * indicate the extension of retirement age.
1st division with the rank of major general just after the 1981 coup. He served
concurrently as commander of the 1st army region with the rank of lieutenant general in
1983. The former was a dove and the latter a hawk.
Members of Class 5, who had long been enemies with Class 7, were promoted to
commanders of strategic regiments after the 1981 coup in order to nullify the influence of
Class 7. As Class 5 began to be promoted to division commanders from 1982, Class 8
were picked up as regiment commanders in their place. The Royal Elephant group was
organized by Lt. Colonel Phiraphon Sanphakphisut (Class 17), who was a commander of
the 1st engineer battalion stationed in the Thonburi area of Bangkok and a close aide of
Athit, since the latter was in the Northeast. He recruited members to the group from
officers of Classes 16-18 and fostered friendship between members through sports. This
group was intended to organize Athit's supporters among battalion commanders.8 )
Internal friction within this faction of Athit's became increasingly visible. One reason
was worsening relations between Prem and Athit. More important, however, was the race
to be Athit's successor. Most of the army top brass, dominated by P-Class 5, would reach
retirement age in 1985 and 1986 (see Table 1). Chawalit and Phijit, due to retire in 1992,
were strong candidates for the post of army chief. The one who got the rank of full general
earlier would have an advantage over the other. There was a possibility that Chawalit
would be promoted to the rank of general in October 1984.
In this situation, there occurred various events relating to the race in July and August,
when the list of personnel changes was under consideration. The police arrested 22
persons including former members of the Communist Party of Thailand in July 1984.
Chawalit was blamed for objecting to the arrests on the grounds that Communists who
surrendered should be pardoned according to Order 66/2523. Then, Sulak Siwarak, a
famous social critic, was charged with lese majesty and arrested as the result of pressure
from Village Scout, a rightist organization. Moreover, some members of Class 7 who had
been dismissed from the army after the 1981 coup expressed support for the extension of
tenure of Athit on 5 August, expecting the reward of reinstatement. Phijit submitted
signatures of military officers to Prem asking for a two-year extension of Athit's tenure.
These movements were intended to help Phijit's promotion by discrediting Chawalit, elicit
rewards by supporting the extension of tenure, and augment Athit's faction by
incorporating Class 7. Major actors behind this series of events included Phiraphon of the
Royal Elephant group and Lt. Colonel Bandit Malaiarisun (Class 8), a close aide of Phijit
and a commander of the 1st infantry regiment. It was reported that they had planned to
resort to a coup if protests against the arrests had engendered political turbulence
[Matichon Sutsapda, 26 August, 2 September 1984].
Diversionary activities of Athit's faction increased tensions between Prem and the
8) The group consisted mainly of supporters of Athit and Phijit, but included supporters of Prem,
which was a weak point of the group.
326 - 44 -
Y. TA~IADA: Coups in Thailand, 1980-1991
army. The tensions were lessened at once when the battalion commanders behind the plot
visited Prem to celebrate his birthday on 26 August. But the tensions were renewed again
on September 15 when the police arrested Manun Rupkhajon and Bunlasak Phojaroen of
Class 7 on charges of attempted assassination of Prem, Athit and the queen. The attempts
were made in 1982, and Prem had ordered two officers of Class 5, Police Colonel Bunchu
Wangkanon and Colonel Phuchong Ninkham, to inquire into the cases. According to weekly
magazines, Prajak, another member of Class 7, made contact with Phijit and Phiraphon to
help his two classmates. Both were released with the help of the queen and the crown
prince [Su Anakhot, 27 September 1984; Wiwat, 22 September 1984]. After this event,
Prajak denounced the conflict between Athit-Phijit faction and Prem-Chawalit faction in the
army and claimed that the arrests were caused by Class 5 in retaliation against Class 7.
Indeed, the list of personnel change sanctioned by the king on 3 September reflected such a
conflict (see Table 1). First, Phijit lost the post of commander of the 1st division and
continued to serve only as the commander of the 1st army region. Second. Sunthon
Khongsomphong, Chawalit's classmate, was promoted to commander of the special warfare
unit to hold the balance of power against Phijit. Third, posts as commanders of divisions in
Bangkok and the surrounding area were monopolized by Class 5. Sujinda Khlaprayun, the
leader of Class 5, was a close aide of Chawalit and brother-in-law of Itsaraphong
Nunphakdi, another powerful member of Class 5. Many of Class 5 did not agree with the
extension of Athit's tenure and strongly objected to the reinstatement of Class 7. Class 5's
promotion to division commanders was a check against Phijit and Class 8, who were
powerful in the 1st army region.
Athit who, had still publicly expressed his support for Prem in the midst of the series
of events after July, criticized the government harshly when it announced the devaluation
of baht on 2 November 1984. Athit. who was abroad then, ordered top military officers to
submit a letter of objection to Prem on 6 November, and criticized the devaluation over
two TV stations under the control of the army on his return [Pisan 1988: 60-68]. Athit's
faction planned a coup because it was impossible for the government to withdraw the
policy [Chat Athipatai, 28 June 1985]. This conflict was subdued only after Athit issued a
statement supporting the devaluation policy on 12 November and Prem displayed the
support of the king by spending ten days with the royal family at a palace in Sakonnakhon
from 16 to 25 November [Matichon Sutsapda, 2 December 1984]. Prem announced on 15
April 1985 that Athit's tenure would be extended to the latter's birthday (31 August) of
1986.
The season of personnel changes came again in July 1985. Three generals of P-Class 5
were due to retire, leaving three vacancies. Those who would be promoted to the rank of
general and retire after Athit were natural candidates for army chief. The race for
successor was fiercer than the previous year. Although there was no open event, rumors of
a coup spread in July and August.
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2. The Coup on 9 September 1985
Early in the morning of 9 September, a coup was staged. About 500 soldiers from the 4th
cavalry battalion led by Manun Rupkhajon and the ground forces of the air force led by
Wing Commander Manat, a junior brother of Manun, occupied strategic locations. They
arrested the commander-in-chief of the air force at his home and took into custody the
three deputy supreme commanders of the armed forces who came to the supreme command
in the morning. They broadcast that the Revolutionary Council headed by General Soem Na
Nakhon, a former supreme commander of the armed forces and a former army chief, had
seized the reins of government. General Kriengsak, a former prime minister, and General
Yot Thephatsadin Na Ayutthaya, a former deputy army chief, joined the coup forces.
This coup was staged when the king was at a palace in the South, Prem in Indonesia,
and Athit in Sweden. However, the government side swiftly set up a counter-coup
headquarters in the 11th infantry regiment by as early as at 6:00 a.m. The leader of the
government side was General Thienchai Sirisamphan. a deputy army chief. The government
side ordered some army units to move and urged the coup forces to surrender through the
radio station of the first division which was left unoccupied by the coup forces. Leaders of
the coup forces, convinced of defeat, started to negotiate with the government side and
agreed to surrender in the afternoon of the same day, on condition that Manun and Manat
would be allowed to flee the country [Anan 1986: 11-14].
The Revolutionary Council explained the reasons for the coup as follows. First,
farmers were suffering from economic hardship, many companies had gone into
bankruptcy, and university graduates could not find jobs. Prices of commodities had risen
due to the devaluation of the baht. To make matters worse, the government had increased
taxes. Second, the government was composed of four coalition parties and could not make a
decisive decisions because of the lack of unity. Party politicians were seeking personal
benefit at the expense of national interests. If nothing were done, the people would lose
confidence in democracy [GPI 1985: 37-41J.
The failure of economic policy and weak leadership of Prem were the alleged reasons.
However, economic recession in the 1980s was experienced not only by Thailand but
almost all countries, and few blamed the Prem administration, which tried to find some
way out of the difficulty by utilizing technocrats. Moreover, the economic difficulties could
not be resolved even if the Prem administration was overthrown. Regarding the weak
leadership, there seemed to be no one who was more suitable for the premiership and could
exert stronger leadership than Premo To sum up, the reasons alleged by the coup forces
were not persuasive and seemed to be nothing more than quibbles.
If the masterminds of the coup were several retired officers, as was the official view
of the army [Kongthap 1985: 5J , their action was tantamount to suicide. It is quite absurd
to assume that Manun, Soem, Kriengsak and Yot believed that they could succeed in the
attempt with only 500 soldiers. They must have had prospects of success when they
staged the coup. To succeed, they must have expected to be joined by larger forces of the
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army. As the coup aimed to overthrow the government, the expected forces would have
come from the anti-Prem faction. At least some of the Athit-Phijit faction must have
promised to join the attempt. And they, not soldiers led by the Rupkajons, constituted the
main body of the coup forces. Therefore, it can be concluded that this coup occurred and
was defeated due to internal conflict within the army.
IV The End of the Prem Administration
1. Dismissal of Athit
As there were few personnel changes after the coup, no tensions arose between the
government and the military. However, the conflict between Prem's faction and Athit's
faction did not disappear and the former became dominant after the personnel changes of
1985 (see Table 1). Chawalit was promoted to chief of staff with the rank of general,
which meant that he certainly would succeed Athit as army chief. Class 5, the supporting
base of Prem's faction, got more posts of division commanders and became the most united
group within the army.
The topic of extension of Athit's tenure was raised again in 1986. General Juthai
Saengthawip, a deputy army chief and P-Class 5, proposed another year's extension of
Athit's tenure at the meeting of Defense Council on 30 January. Some 70 officers of Class
lOon 10 March and some 60 of Class 8 on 20 March visited Athit to express support for
the extension. Juthai held a news conference to express his support on 22 March.
Moreover, Phijit held a party celebrating Athit's honorary doctorate on 23 March. In spite
of these pressures, Prem announced the rejection of the extension as early as 24 March to
prevent further pressure from the army. While rumor of a coup was circulating, Colonel
Phiraphon, a close aide of Athit, who served concurrently as commander of the 1st
engineer battalion and deputy commander of the 1st engineer regiment, was suddenly
dismissed as commander of the 1st engineer battalion, which meant he was transferred
from Bangkok to Ratburi on 9 April, immediately after a bomb blast at the Erawan Hotel
in Bangkok where Prem and United States Defense Secretary Weinberger were due to have
a dinner on that day [Bangkok Post, 12 April 1986J. The rejection of the extension of
Athit's tenure and the transfer of his close aide reflected the power relations between Prem
and Athit.
However, the defeat of a government bill on 1 May forced Prem to dissolve parliament
and schedule general elections for 17 July. The government's defeat was brought about by
rebels of the Social Action Party, one of the government parties. Rebels formed a new
party and vowed to support Athit to be the new prime minister after the election. Athit
was suspected of being the mastermind of the bill's defeat and the creation of the new
party, which increased tensions between the government and the military [Suchit 1987:
4 5J. At this juncture, Sunthon led about 70 officers from the special warfare unit on 13
May and Chaichana Tharichat led about 50 officers of the 3rd army region on 15 May to
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visit Prem to demonstrate the strength of Prem's faction, despite knowing well that such an
action would incur Athit's displeasure. Both Sunthon and Chaichana were Class 1. Prem
went to his house in the Suranari bt;lse and was guarded by soldiers of the 2nd army
region on 26 May. On the next day he announced the dismissal of Athit as army chief and
appointed Chawalit as the new army chief.
2. Prem's Resignation
Chawalit was 54 years old when he was appointed army chief, being the youngest army
chief since the 1970s. On assuming the post, he declared that he would resign within two
years although voluntary resignation before the age limit was quite rare among Thai senior
officers. This was partly because he intended to play politics after retirement and wished
to open the way to politics by fully supporting Prem, in contrast with Athit who challenged
the premier. In addition, he had to consolidate his supporting base in the army in
preparation for political life. It was better for him to give way to one of his juniors. and
thus prevent their discontent, than to stay until the age of 60. For example, Sujinda, the
leader of Class 5, was only one year junior to him.
Chawalit, who concurrently assumed the post of supreme commander in October 1986,
paid attention to the creation and widening of his supporting base in the army through the
annual personnel changes. Then, in 1987, a crisis occurred. Chawalit tried to appoint
Sunthon as deputy army chief, Jaruai Wongsayan as assistant army chief, Wanchai
Ruangtrakun as chief of staff of the armed forces, all of whom were Class 1, and Wijit
Sukmak, who belonged to Class 2 and was trusted by Prem, as chief of staff of the army.
However Prem, who had resigned as defense minister in August 1986, revised the
submitted list. Sunthon was promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces, Wanchai to
deputy army chief, Jaruai to chief of staff of the army, and Sujinda to assistant army chief
(see Table 1). Moreover, Prem rejected the appointment of Kaset Rotjananin as air chief
against the will of the retiring air chief [Lak Thai, 24 September 1987]. Chawalit was
perplexed at this intervention, especially at the fact that Wanchai was promoted to deputy
army chief, the post of the most promising successor. Although Wanchai was Class 1, he
was close to Athit and, therefore, not a favored successor. The most favored candidate,
Sunthon, was transferred to the supreme command, Jaruai was not equal to the post of
army chief in terms of leadership, and it was premature for Sujinda to assume the post. 9 )
Thus it became difficult for Chawalit to resign in 1988. However, since Chawalit did not
reveal his discontent, the expected tensions were avoided.
In April 1988, all 16 ministers of the Democrat Party resigned from the government
after rebels of the party voted against the government bill. Prem dissolved the parliament
and scheduled general elections for 24 July. Chawalit tendered his resignation to Prem on
9) Once transferred to the supreme command, it has been quite difficult to return to the army in a
significant post. Thus Sunthon virtually ceased to be successor.
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1 May but it was not accepted on the grounds that the military still needed him. Chawalit
continued to support Prem and ordered officers to demonstrate their support for Prem in
the middle of the month. In addition to the military, major political parties also expressed
support for Premo Everybody anticipated that Prem would take the task of prime minister
again after the election.
On 27 May, 99 academics and intellectuals petitioned the king to stop supporting
Premo They insisted that Prem should be neutral. but leaned upon the king and ordered the
military to demonstrate support for him in order to retain the premiership. Such action
would cause divisions among soldiers. civil servants and the people and distrust for the
parliamentary democracy. And they begged the king to make Prem remain politically
neutral [Su Anakhot. 1. 8 June 1988]. They knew well that the Prem government would
not collapse as long as either the king or the military continued to support Prem, unless
Prem himself decided to retire. This petition could be regarded as one important reason
why Prem suddenly announced that he would not accept the premiership on 27 July. Prem
consulted with Chawalit to choose Chatchai, the leader of the Chat Thai Party, which got
most seats in the election. to be the new prime minister.
V The Coup of 23 February 1991
1. The Rise of Class 5
While the relations between the military and Chatchai were generally good. tensions within
the army were gradually rising. One reason was the expected retirement of Chawalit, who
submitted a resignation letter to Chatchai in May 1989 which was not accepted.
Everybody was concerned with his resignation because it would affect the army. Second,
Chawalit continued to carry out balanced personnel changes, paying attention to every
faction in order to keep the unity of the army. To accomplish this purpose, he had to
increase people's chances of promotion. Many new positions were created, personnel
changes came to be made twice a year, in April and October, and two lists came to be made
at once. Third. Class 5 augmented their power increasingly. On assuming the post of
assistant army chief. Sujinda became the heir apparent to Chawalit and Class 5 came to
bring pressure on Chawalit to resign.
The best way to lessen tensions was for Chawalit to resign. He declared publicly for
the first time in December 1989 that Sujinda was his successor. As Chatchai welcomed
Chawalit to his cabinet, Chawalit resigned as army chief-cum-supreme commander on 28
March 1990 and joined the government as deputy prime minister and minister of defense.
Sunthon became supreme commander and Sujinda army chief. Class 5 under the leadership
of Sujinda, the new army chief, consolidated their power increasingly through personnel
changes in April and October in the same year. Class 11 was promoted to division
commanders in place of Classes 8 and 9. It was the coming of age of Class 5. The extent to
which Class 5 monopolized important posts in the army was unprecedented (see Table 1).
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Not less significant was the top brass of the navy and air force, because officers who
graduated cadet academies in 1958, the same year as Class 5, got power as well. In the air
force, Kaset became air chief in October 1989 in place of Woranat Aphijari, who had been
in the post since 1987. Kaset was on very good terms with Sujinda and they organized
"0143 Club."lO) This was a gathering of officers who graduated military cadet academies
in 1958 and held periodical convivial meetings from April 1988. In the navy also, it
became certain that a member of the club would assume the post of navy chief in October
1991. It was quite rare for officers across the three armed forces to boast such unity, and
this unity enabled them to control the military as a whole.
Chawalit, who had long criticized the corruption of politicians, did not stop his
criticism after joining the cabinet. He criticized Chaloem Yubamrung, a minister to the
Office of Prime Minister, for his being convicted by the Counter Corruption Commission in
May 1990. Chaloem countered that Chawalit should reflect on himself before criticizing
others, and jeered at Chawalit's wife as a "walking jewelry box." Chawalit submitted his
resignation in the morning of 11 June. It was the day when Chatchai was to have left for
the United States.
Top brass visited Chawalit early in the morning of the day to try to persuade him not
to resign. Then they called on the prime minister to ask him to dismiss Chaloem. Various
units of the army held a gathering for "the dignity of soldiers." Top brass called Chatchai
late at night to talk about the matter again. Although Sujinda promised that there would be
no coup while the premier was abroad, a rumor circulated of a coup after 11 June and
Chaloem ordered the trailer-mounted radio station belonging to the Mass Communication
Organization in fear of a coup on June 17. 11 ) On 19 June, ChawaIit had lunch with many
senior officers from all over the country at the Army Golf Course and demonstrated his
close relations with the army [Lak Thai, 25 June 1990]. On returning to the country,
Chatchai asked Chawalit to rejoin the government but was rejected. On 22 June, Sunthon
confiscated the mobile radio station on the ground that it disturbed the military radio.
Flaming tensions seemed to be calmed down when Chatchai promised to cope with
Chaloem's problem properly and himself assumed the vacant post of defense minister,
rejecting the suggestion to appoint Athit, now the leader of an opposition party. However,
tensions were revived by the cabinet reshuffle in August. Chaloem was retained as a
minister and Athit's party joined the government. Although Chatchai rejected Athit's claim
for the defense portfolio, his joining the government itself was a check against the military
dominated by an anti-Athit faction.
Chaloem made a counterargument against the military over the case of the mobile
radio station for 30 minutes on TV on 4 November. The military, which repeatedly had
10) "01" means B. E. 2501 (A.D. 1958), "3" means three forces of the army, navy and air force,
and"4" means the three forces and the police.
ll) This radio truck was purchased by Prem in order to counteract a coup.
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requested his dismissal, raged at this. Sujinda warned Chatchai that the premier must
either resign himself or dismiss Chaloem if he wished to enjoy the confidence of the
military. The next day, military leaders asked Chatchai to dismiss Chaloem at the breakfast
meeting which had been held weekly at the premier's house since the start of his
administration. Chatchai at last decided to dismiss Chaloem, and promised to do so before
flying to Japan on 8 November. Chatchai returned home on 17 November and began to talk
about a cabinet reshuffle with leaders of the government parties. He called on the king at
Sakonnakhon to report about the reshuffle on 21 November. However, he kept Chaloem in
the cabinet as deputy minister of education on the grounds that some party leaders had
objected to his dismissal. This was not persuasive at all, because the reshuffle in August
was made even without consultation with leaders of the Chat Thai Party. Athit added oil to
the fire by saying at the meeting of government leaders that there would be no problem
with the military even if Chaloem was not dismissed.
November 21 was the watershed of relations between the government and the military.
A rumor circulated that Chatchai planned to dismiss Sujinda and Sunthon at an audience
with the king on that day [Lak Thai, 26 November 1990]. Although its authenticity was
not ascertained, it might be true judging from the strong reactions of the military. First,
top brass canceled all the weekly breakfast meetings with the premier from that day.
Second, Sujinda himself was given an audience with the king in the afternoon of the same
day. This audience seemed to come about abruptly, despite the military's insistence that it
had been scheduled in advance. Third, division commanders of the army held a gathering
and expressed their discontent against the premier on the same day. Maj. General Samphao
Chusi, commander of the antiaircraft artillery division, suggested the possibility of a coup
at the gathering by stating, "How can the army chief be dismissed when he has committed
no fault? .. We will take action without issuing notice in advance hereafter" [Matichon
Sutsapda, 2 December 1990]. Soldiers felt that Chatchai's breaking his word made a mock
of the military and injured its dignity. On 23 November, military radio broadcast that the
military had lost confidence in the premier.
Voices were also raised among government parties that they would not go down with
Chaloem. At last, Chatchai reshuffled his cabinet on December 14 and ousted Chaloem. But
the military did not soften its attitude. It next targeted Manun Rupkhajon, who had been
reinstated in 1989 and served as Chatchai's close aide in coping with the military since
February 1990 [Matichon Sutsapda, 21 February, 25 November 1990]. The military
asked Pol. Lt. General Bunchu, a member of Class 5 and commander of the police central
investigation bureau, to resume its inquiry into the attempted murder case, which had been
brought to a halt since 1984. Moreover, currency was given to a rumor that not only
Manun but also Kraisak, Chatchai's son, was involved in the case. Kraisak was a key
person in the premier's advisory body, called "Ban Phitsanulok," which was suspected of
being behind the premier's strong attitudes against the military.
In addition to canceling the breakfast meetings, the military leaders expressed their
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lack of confidence in Chatchai by not paying him a New Year's visit, but at the same time
visiting Prem and Chawalit. To break the deadlock, Chatchai asked Sunthon to hold a
luncheon for top brass and cabinet. ministers on 15 January as symbolic gesture of
reconciliation. However, a rumor circulated that Sunthon's tenure would be extended. As
such a move would arouse discontent against Sunthon within the military, the extension
was not expedient for him at all and the rumor stirred military's wrath against the
premier's maneuvers. However, Chatchai was not daunted and on 20 January he suddenly
dismissed the police chief even though there was no clear fault with him. This dismissal
had two meanings. One was to intimidate the military leadership. As rumors about the
dismissal of military leadership gained increasing currency, this added substance to them.
Another was to promote Bunchu from commander of the central investigation bureau to
assistant director of the police department and, thus, deprive him of the authority to look
into the attempted murder case. This increased the tension between the military and the
premier. On 13 February, Sunthon ordered that documents of the case should not be
handed over to the new commander. Chatchai, who wished to wrest away the initiative of
the inquiries into the case from Class 5 and the military, got angry and on 20 February
appointed Athit as the new deputy minister of defense. Unable to accept the appointment,
on 22 February field officers called on Chatchai to reconsider it, but their appeal was
rejected. There was a rumor of a coup on the same day and the premier ordered policemen
from the crime suppression division to guard his house. Relieved that there was no coup,
Chatchai flied to Chiengmai with Athit to witness the inauguration of Athit to his post
from Donmuang air base the next morning.
2. The Coup of 23 February 1991
Chatchai and Athit were arrested by men of the air force before taking off, and a coup
started. This attempt was joined by top brass of the three armed forces who formed a
National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) headed by Sunthon. Soldiers from the 1st division
and antiaircraft artillery division occupied strategic locations in the afternoon and Sunthon
declared a success of the coup.
NPKC noted five reasons for the coup. First, politicians were selfish and corrupt. The
premier had put forth a counterargument that receipts as evidence should be presented if
there should be grafters. Second, cabinet ministers arbitrarily intervened in personnel
changes of government officials in order to make them submissive. Third, the prime
minister and his close associates constructed an image of democratic government. But, in
fact, the premier, ministers and MPs centralized power and got rid of opposing forces,
seeking giant profits for themselves. This was a parliamentary dictatorship and very
dangerous to a democratic regime. Fourth, "only the military held out against the political
influence of politicians and political parties." The government tried every means to destroy
the unity and solidarity of the military. The military could not tolerate this. Fifth, the
prime minister made much of Manun, who was the mastermind of two unsuccessful coups
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and involved in attempted murder cases. Especially regarding the attempted murder of the
queen, the premier tried to conceal the fact and shift the guilt to others, which could not be
permitted by the people [Khanabannathikan 1991: 5].
This coup attempt received royal sanction with ease. Anan Panyarachun, a former
permanent undersecretary of the ministry of foreign affairs and now a leading
businessman, was appointed as the new prime minister on 2 March. He formed a cabinet
comprised mainly of technocrats and businessmen. Most people appreciated the reasons
given by the military and consented to the coup. However, it would be rash to think that
all five reasons cited were true causes of the coup. The first, second and third reasons
were most persuasive for the people in general. However, they did not relate directly to the
interests of the military. Even if the military was discontent with these, they were not
necessarily sufficient cause for it to run the risk of staging a coup. Moreover, they do not
explain why the coup was staged on 23 February. The fifth reason would remain forgotten
unless the military made an issue of it.
The fourth reason, on the other hand, was an expression of the mounting conflict
between the military and the premier since June, especially since November 1990. There is
ample reason to believe that NPKC staged the coup just to prevent Chatchai's audience
with the king. First, Sunthon and Kaset were abroad on 22 February. If the coup had been
planned carefully, the leadership would not have gone abroad just beforehand. Second, the
coup started not with the usual occupation of strategic locations but with the arrest of the
premier. Third, several hours lapsed after the arrest of Chatchai until Sunthon declared
the seizure of power over TV, and he was ill-prepared for the declaration. Thus, we may
well think that the coup was intended to prevent Chatchai's audience with the throne. The
audience was officially scheduled to confirm Athit in the defense portfolio.
But the military seemed to suspect strongly that the premier would submit proposals
for dismissal of military leadership. If Chatchai had planned the dismissal of the
commander, it was quite natural that the military should react strongly against it. Praman
Adireksan, brother-in-law of Chatchai and former leader of the Chat Thai Party, stated
after the coup, "considering various factors, the true causes of the coup lay in the fact that
Chatchai planned the dismissal of military leadership and appointed Athit as deputy
minister of defense" [Matichon Sutsapda, 9 June 1991]. In sum, the conflict between the
military and the government, which had developed to the extent that the premier
considered the dismissal of the military leadership, was the real cause of the successful
coup.
We can also not overlook the long-term decrease of the military's political power since
the 1970s. The military's source of political power consists in its ability to stage a coup.
As there had been no successful coup since 1977, it was inevitable that its political power
should have decreased gradually. The government did not have to be afraid of a coup if it
should not occur. Chatchai seemed to have taken a strong stance against the military
because he believed that there would be no coup anymore. His attitudes towards the
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military impressed people with the weakened power of the military. The military lost
patience at being thus slighted.
VI Conclusion: Impediments to Coups
We have considered the causes of the three coups since 1981. The 1981 coup resulted
from the conflict between Class 7 and anti-Class 7 factions, and the 1985 coup from the
conflict centered around the struggle for succession to the post of army chief. In contrast,
the 1991 coup was engendered by a conflict between the military and the government.
In addition, it was at time of internal conflict in the military or conflict between the
military and the government that rumors of a coup gained currency, for example, in March
1983, July, August and November 1984, April 1986, June 1990 and so forth. Thus we
may conclude that the possibility of a coup became higher when internal conflict intensified
or relations with the government worsened.
However, intensified internal conflict or worsened relations with the government do
not always engender a coup. There are impediments to a coup. Generally, there are thought
to be three such factors. Economic development since the 1960s is the first of them. A
coup would damage the country's economy and reputation severely, leading to a decrease of
foreign investment and tourism, and economic sanction against an undemocratic practice. It
is widely thought that even if the military succeeded in a coup, it could not manage the
economy, which has become complicated. Second, politics has been democratized gradually
since the 1970s. Political parties have grown in force with support from businessmen.
Chatchai was the first leader of a political party to become prime minister since 1976. In
addition to these domestic changes, advanced countries, especially the United States, have
come to advocate democratization. It is thought that not even the Thai military could resist
"the third wave of democratization" [Huntington 1991] since the middle of the 1970s.
Third, the king, who has the authority to sanction a coup, has augmented his power and
prestige gradually since the Sarit regime (1958-63). His role as an impediment came to the
fore in defeating the 1981 coup. It is widely believed that there can be no successful coup,
and that the military would not dare to resort to a coup, insofar as the king withholds his
sanction.
It is certain that these factors function as impediments to a coup to some extent.
However, there seem to be differences in the effectiveness of each factor. Regarding the
economic development and democratization, the military claimed that it would solve
economic problems and democratize politics in the coups of 1981 and 1985. However, in
the 1991 coup, the military had to adapt to the new situation of remarkable economic
growth since the second half of the 1980s. The military no longer claimed to offer
solutions to economic problems but, rather, had to try to minimize the damage to the
economy as far as possible. In order to win the confidence of domestic and foreign
businessmen in its economic policy, the military formed a government consisting of
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esteemed technocrats and businessmen and entrusted to it the management of the economy.
Most domestic businessmen, discontent with the Chatchai administration, which had
extended special favor only to those businessmen with good connections with government
parties, welcomed the Anan administration, which seemed to be more impartial. Therefore,
damage to the economy was kept to a minimum. Moreover, the damage was mixed with that
brought by the Persian Gulf War. On the other hand, regarding democratization, political
parties still lacked the broad supporting base of the people and were far from able to
prevent a coup [Tamada 1988]. Although the Chatchai government was democratic in that
most of ministers including the premier were MPs, the major government parties were little
different from those of the Prem government. Nevertheless, ministers of the Chatchai
government often claimed it to be more democratic in character, and they pursued selfish
interests far more straightforwardly than under Prem, who kept a sharp watch on
corruption. NPKC did not fail to capitalize on this weakness and mobilized the support of
the people by promising a cleanup of politics and general elections before March 1992.
Moreover, criticism from the United States increased anti-US sentiments, which had arisen
from trade problems since the 1980s, and adversely increased support for the coup. To
wit, even the remarkable economic development was not enough to prevent the coup and
parliamentary politics still had many crucial weak points.
In contrast, the throne has played an important role of an impediment to a coup. Due
to the king's decisive role in defeating the 1981 coup, the 1985 coup had to be attempted
while he was not in Bangkok. Athit could not resort to a coup openly, despite his full
political ambition, partly because the throne supported Premo The king was reported to
support the democratization of Thai politics and objected to coups [Time, 14 January
1991]. However, even the king could not withhold his sanction of the 1991 coup, which
was staged by the military as a whole and left no countervailing forces within the military.
All that the throne could do was to urge the military to transfer power to a civilian
government as early as possible.
This shows the crucial nature of the existence of countervailing or rival factions in
the military and suggests a fourth factor, that is, the internal situation of the military,
which can act as an impediment to a coup. The coups in 1981 and 1985 derived from the
factional conflict within the army and, thus, there were anti-coup factions. In contrast,
there was no such countervailing faction within the military in the 1991 coup.
Regarding this point, it should be remembered that the army has been faced with the
chronic problems of a lack of strong leadership and internal conflict since the 1970s. Class
7 gathered strength just because of the internal conflict among the army leadership. Their
attempted coup failed mainly because of the role of the throne, but the existence of an
opposing faction within the army also was decisive. This internal conflict since the 1970s
was eased temporarily by the rise of a strong leader, Athit. But when he began to challenge
Prem, the Prem-Chawalit faction rose to countervail Athit's faction. The balance of power
between two such factions functions. on the one hand, as a trigger of a coup, but on the
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other hand, as impediment to it. This is because the existence of such a countervailing
faction increases the possibility of failure of a coup attempt and, thus, makes it difficult to
stage a coup. Athit could not resort .to a coup largely because of this. The 1985 coup,
which was staged in just such a situation, resulted in betrayal and failure. Thus, internal
conflict or the balance of power within the army is a significant factor in preventing a
coup attempt or defeating such an attempt.
However, such conflict disappeared under Chawalit's leadership and with the rise of
Class 5. Class 5 succeeded the Prem-Chawalit faction and consolidated their power to
become the strongest group in the 1980s. Moreover, they formed the 0143 Club and
established a unity across the army, navy, air force and police. Thus the impediment to a
coup within the military was lost. As even Prem, who had a stable supporting base within
the military, was most careful to avoid irritating the military, Chatchai, devoid of such a
supporting base, should have paid more attention. But he enraged the military since with
his handling of Chaloem's problem. He bet the democratic legitimacy of his government. If
he could have weathered the conflict with the military, the political power of the military,
which had witnessed a gradual decrease since the latter half of the 1970s, would have
decreased further. But the basis of party politics was too fragile to fight this battle,
because the people were dissatisfied with the corrupt practices of the democratic
government and relieved by its fall. It should be added, however, that what the people
welcomed was not the resurgence of the military government but the downfall of the
corrupt one.
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